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Foreign	  Affairs!	  That's	  for	  People	  Who	  Don't	  Have	  to	  Work	  to	  Make	  
a	  Living	  	  Edmund	  F.	  Wehrle	  	  Kudos	  to	  the	  editors	  for	  this	  special	  issue	  exploring	  the	  intersections	  between	  labor	  and	  diplomatic	  history.	  Diplomatic	  historians	  long	  have	  urged	  expanding	  their	  field	  beyond	  the	  narrow	  confines	  of	  elite	  decision	  makers.	  This	  roundtable,	  responding	  to	  that	  mandate,	  offers	  yet	  more	  evidence	  of	  a	  thriving	  field,	  embracing	  new	  subject	  matters	  and	  approaches—and	  emerging	  richer	  for	  the	  exercise.	  	  U.S.	  labor	  history,	  in	  my	  analysis,	  could	  benefit	  from	  a	  similar	  reawakening.	  A	  sense	  of	  drift,	  perhaps	  accompanying	  the	  general	  decline	  of	  trade	  unions,	  recently	  has	  shadowed	  the	  field.	  Of	  course,	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Inspired	  by	  the	  imaginative	  work	  of	  E.	  P.	  Thompson	  and	  Herbert	  Gutman,	  labor	  history	  thrived	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  Pioneering	  scholars	  countered	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  with	  remarkable,	  “forgotten”	  histories	  of	  worker	  activism	  and	  class	  consciousness.	  Meticulous	  local	  studies	  revealed	  a	  genuine	  grassroots	  challenge	  to	  dominant	  capitalist	  values.	  Yet	  such	  radicalism,	  these	  studies	  suggested,	  inevitably	  proved	  ephemeral,	  quickly	  undermined	  by	  one	  of	  several	  corroding	  forces:	  recalcitrant	  capitalists,	  an	  oppositional	  state,	  sudden	  economic	  downturns—or	  quite	  often	  divisions	  among	  workers	  themselves.	  “Lost	  moment”	  monographs	  piled	  up,	  while	  labor	  historians	  strove	  to	  produce	  a	  synthesis—with	  limited	  success.	  	  By	  the	  1990s,	  these	  romantically	  inclined	  historians	  met	  a	  stiff	  challenge.	  With	  the	  worldwide	  trend	  toward	  economic	  liberalization,	  their	  work	  seemed	  less	  relevant.	  Meanwhile,	  a	  group	  led	  by	  David	  Roediger	  began	  rewriting	  labor	  history	  aiming	  to	  expose	  structures	  of	  “whiteness”	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  working-­‐class	  experience;	  racism	  not	  radicalism	  defined	  American	  workers,	  they	  submitted.	  Today,	  labor	  historians	  are	  struggling	  to	  regain	  their	  footing.	  Many	  have	  moved	  to	  further	  examine	  the	  junctions	  between	  race	  and	  class.	  Others,	  commendably,	  are	  exploring	  the	  influence	  of	  labor	  on	  international	  issues.	  	  This	  forum	  suggests	  much	  about	  both	  the	  potential	  and	  potential	  hazards	  as	  labor	  historians	  move	  to	  investigate	  international	  relations.	  A	  prime	  weakness	  of	  labor	  history	  has	  been	  a	  tendency	  to	  portray	  workers	  as	  labor	  historians	  would	  want	  them—as	  militant	  anticapitalists.	  As	  this	  roundtable	  demonstrates,	  working-­‐class	  radicalism	  existed.	  Its	  extent	  and	  influence,	  however,	  remains	  debatable.	  	  Echoing	  arguments	  first	  set	  out	  in	  her	  1995	  book,	  Beth	  McKillen	  posits	  that	  “decentering	  the	  narrative”—introducing	  the	  perspectives	  of	  “critical	  working-­‐class	  actors”—reveals	  broad,	  radical	  resistance	  to	  Wilsonian	  internationalism	  during	  the	  World	  War	  I	  era.	  Wilson	  hoped	  the	  International	  Labor	  Organization,	  forged	  in	  large	  measure	  by	  his	  loyal	  ally	  American	  Federation	  of	  Labor	  (AFL)	  President	  Samuel	  Gompers,	  would	  provide	  the	  stabilizing	  labor	  component	  in	  his	  broader	  global	  
vision.	  Like	  Wilson,	  Gompers	  subscribed	  to	  a	  decidedly	  American	  version	  of	  international	  cooperation,	  privileging	  “voluntary”	  trade	  unions	  and	  free	  enterprise.	  Both	  Gompers	  and	  Wilson,	  however,	  would	  soon	  be	  shocked	  by	  the	  determined	  “grassroots	  opposition”	  they	  encountered.	  	  The	  precise	  nature	  of	  this	  resistance	  will	  be	  the	  sticking	  point	  for	  many	  readers.	  McKillen	  urges	  that	  we	  appreciate	  “the	  sheer	  diversity	  of	  working-­‐class	  experiences	  and	  perspectives.”	  Yet	  she	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  socialist	  opposition,	  including	  Industrial	  Workers	  of	  the	  World	  militants	  and	  Mexican-­‐American	  anarchists.	  McKillen	  also	  cites	  wartime	  strike	  activity	  and	  draft	  resistance	  as	  evidence	  of	  wide	  radically	  inclined	  dissent.	  We	  are	  advised	  of	  the	  “value	  of	  chasing	  slackers	  and	  draft	  resisters	  down	  the	  back	  alleys	  of	  Chicago	  and	  the	  backroads	  of	  the	  rural	  South.”	  This	  is	  all	  fine	  and	  good.	  But	  clearly	  a	  myriad	  of	  motivations	  lay	  behind	  draft	  dodging	  and	  wartime	  labor	  unrest.	  White	  workers,	  well	  versed	  in	  Jim	  Crow	  racism,	  frequently	  refused	  to	  toil	  alongside	  black	  migrants,	  sparking	  many	  strikes.	  Draft	  resistance,	  likewise,	  is	  too	  complex	  for	  quick	  generalizations.	  While	  one	  doubts	  that	  “most	  draft-­‐age	  men	  tried	  to	  avoid	  conscription,”	  those	  who	  did,	  undoubtedly,	  were	  responding	  to	  varying	  and	  deeply	  personal	  (often	  religious)	  motivations.	  Wilsonian	  rhetoric	  failed	  to	  impress	  resisters,	  but	  this	  hardly	  automatically	  puts	  them	  in	  league	  with	  radical	  socialists.	  	  Socialists,	  anarchists,	  and	  radicals	  deserve	  our	  attention	  (and	  have	  received	  more	  than	  their	  share).	  But	  my	  sense	  is	  that	  more	  particularistic	  concerns	  occupied	  most	  workers.	  Perennial	  economic	  challenges	  demanded	  careful,	  often	  conservative	  planning.	  A	  general	  distaste	  for	  concentrated	  power	  probably	  led	  many	  toward	  isolationism	  and	  suspicion	  of	  both	  Wilson	  and	  his	  determined	  opponents.	  Simultaneously,	  I	  do	  not	  doubt	  that	  many	  workers	  were	  swept	  up,	  briefly	  at	  least,	  in	  the	  “Wilsonian	  moment.”	  Michael	  Kazin's	  admonition	  remains	  germane:	  “Labor	  scholars	  have	  not	  …	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  abundant	  evidence	  that	  white	  wage-­‐earners	  found	  more	  to	  celebrate	  than	  to	  curse	  in	  the	  achievements	  of	  a	  liberal	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  which	  their	  own	  efforts	  did	  so	  much	  to	  develop	  and	  improve.”1	  	  If	  the	  First	  World	  War	  mobilized	  workers	  to	  embrace	  far-­‐reaching	  alternatives	  to	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  World	  War	  II	  fostered	  similar	  pregnant	  moments,	  according	  to	  Daniel	  Garcia	  and	  Geert	  Van	  Goethem.	  Based	  on	  his	  study	  of	  five	  thousand	  GI	  “gripes”	  to	  the	  editor,	  Garcia	  sees	  an	  intense	  class	  consciousness	  leading	  to	  a	  virtual	  mutiny	  among	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  military	  in	  1945.	  While	  it	  is	  exciting	  to	  hear	  the	  dissident	  voices	  cited	  by	  the	  author,	  his	  piece	  yields	  few	  concrete	  conclusions	  (Garcia	  himself	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  describe	  his	  work	  as	  “a	  point	  of	  departure”	  and	  inconclusive).	  	  Without	  question,	  war	  and	  military	  life	  had	  exhausted	  American	  GIs	  by	  1945—as	  is	  abundantly	  clear	  from	  the	  gripes.	  A	  number	  of	  gripers	  adopted	  radical	  critiques	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  Were	  these	  views	  representative?	  We	  have	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  (by	  definition,	  we	  are	  hearing	  only	  the	  most	  passionate	  and	  angry	  voices).	  Garcia	  refers	  to	  “many	  GIs”	  fourteen	  times	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  study.	  Real	  numbers,	  
however,	  remain	  elusive.	  Similar	  evidentiary	  problems	  surface	  throughout	  the	  piece.	  Arguing	  the	  military	  “mutiny	  was,	  to	  a	  large	  degree,	  influenced	  by	  a	  strike	  wave	  led	  by	  the	  United	  Auto	  Workers,”	  Garcia	  offers	  only	  one	  piece	  of	  evidence:	  a	  colonel	  who	  admonished	  malcontents	  “you're	  not	  working	  for	  General	  Motors.”	  	  From	  the	  evidence	  presented,	  I	  sense	  that	  isolationism	  and	  traditional	  American	  skepticism	  of	  authority	  rather	  than	  radicalism	  and	  class	  consciousness	  appear	  at	  the	  core	  of	  GI	  gripes.	  Garcia	  himself	  presents	  isolationist	  Senator	  Robert	  Taft	  as	  “[e]choing	  what	  many	  GIs	  were	  feeling”	  by	  linking	  commercialism	  to	  postwar	  U.S.	  ambitions.	  	  Geert	  Van	  Goethem	  sees	  similar	  forces	  emanating	  from	  World	  War	  II.	  Van	  Goethem—the	  only	  featured	  author	  offering	  an	  international,	  multiarchival	  study—argues	  that	  bitter	  disputes	  between	  the	  AFL	  and	  the	  British	  Trade	  Union	  Council	  scuttled	  prospects	  for	  labor	  to	  shape	  meaningful	  postwar	  planning.	  Soviet	  participation	  in	  international	  labor	  alliances,	  adamantly	  resisted	  by	  the	  AFL,	  proved	  the	  fatal	  sticking	  point.	  Again	  we	  encounter	  a	  lost	  moment,	  rich	  with	  potential,	  but	  ultimately	  doomed.	  In	  fact,	  more	  was	  in	  play,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  than	  mere	  AFL	  recalcitrance.	  Whatever	  the	  immediate	  circumstances,	  sooner	  or	  later	  the	  larger	  ideological	  divide	  between	  East	  and	  West	  would	  have	  obstructed	  any	  moves	  toward	  international	  labor	  cooperation.	  Van	  Goethem's	  article	  does	  make	  clear	  one	  often	  overlooked	  issue:	  sharp	  divisions	  existed	  in	  the	  early	  1940s	  between	  the	  AFL,	  eager	  to	  start	  its	  own	  Cold	  War,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  determined	  to	  promote	  international	  labor	  cooperation.	  Labor	  and	  state,	  Van	  Goethem	  insists,	  both	  supported	  a	  “determined	  interventionism,”	  but	  he	  cannot	  paper	  over	  fundamental	  labor-­‐state	  tensions	  during	  the	  war	  years.	  	  Ben	  Sears,	  however,	  rejects	  any	  notion	  of	  daylight	  between	  U.S.	  labor	  leaders	  and	  U.S.	  state.	  Instead	  he	  sees	  a	  “tacit	  agreement	  between	  the	  foreign	  policy	  apparatus	  and	  the	  CIO	  (and	  the	  AFL	  as	  well)”	  brokered	  by	  “perceptive	  business	  leaders	  [who]	  saw	  opportunity	  and	  proposed	  to	  enlist	  the	  nation's	  newly	  influential	  labor	  movement	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	  their	  foreign	  policy	  agenda.”	  Sears	  is	  hardly	  alone	  in	  subscribing	  to	  this	  “sell-­‐out”	  thesis.	  But	  the	  AFL	  (as	  Van	  Goethem	  makes	  clear)	  and	  rising	  elements	  within	  the	  Congress	  of	  Industrial	  Organizations,	  for	  their	  own	  involved	  reasons,	  were	  already	  rabidly	  anti-­‐Stalinist	  from	  the	  early	  1940s	  (some	  earlier)	  and	  clashing	  with	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  White	  House	  as	  a	  result.	  If	  anything,	  the	  postwar	  U.S.	  government	  came	  to	  adopt	  labor's	  foreign	  policy	  outlook—not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  For	  balance,	  Sears	  (and	  Van	  Goethem)	  might	  have	  explained	  the	  key	  principle	  driving	  American	  labor's	  resistance	  to	  Soviet	  accommodation:	  the	  conviction	  that	  state-­‐run	  “unions”	  behind	  the	  iron	  curtain	  were	  frauds,	  dishonest	  representations	  of	  workers'	  interests.	  One	  might	  expect	  Sears,	  who	  sharply	  chides	  American	  labor	  for	  its	  subjugation	  to	  the	  state,	  to	  recognize,	  at	  least	  in	  passing,	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  “unions”	  explicitly	  dominated	  by	  their	  governments.	  	  
Sears	  concludes	  with	  the	  triumph	  of	  a	  “grass	  roots”	  movement	  among	  workers	  to	  challenge	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  Iraq.	  No	  doubt	  his	  piece	  will	  resonate	  with	  many	  politically	  inclined	  labor	  historians.	  Others,	  however,	  might	  see	  presentism	  and	  an	  undue	  focus	  on	  assigning	  blame	  rather	  than	  exploring	  and	  explaining	  all	  perspectives.	  	  In	  the	  late	  1940s,	  a	  blue-­‐collar	  worker	  famously	  dismissed	  foreign	  affairs	  as	  “for	  people	  who	  don't	  have	  to	  work	  to	  make	  a	  living”—generously	  supplying	  my	  commentary	  title.	  His	  sentiment	  has	  tempted	  some	  diplomatic	  historians	  to	  write	  off	  working	  people	  altogether.2	  Our	  roundtable	  participants	  would	  vehemently	  disagree,	  positing	  instead	  an	  activist,	  left-­‐leaning	  “working	  class,”	  poised	  (even	  at	  this	  hour)	  to	  overturn	  official	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  I	  am	  not	  convinced,	  but	  I	  do	  agree	  that	  diplomatic	  historians	  should	  study	  thoughtfully	  the	  words	  and	  actions	  of	  working	  people.	  The	  flippant	  worker	  I	  cited,	  for	  instance,	  betrays	  a	  populist	  skepticism	  of	  power	  brokers.	  Daily	  pressures	  to	  “make	  a	  living”	  and	  secure	  limited	  gains	  undoubtedly	  fed	  a	  distrust	  of	  concentrated	  power—manifesting	  itself	  in	  countless	  ways.	  But	  that	  skepticism	  also	  extended	  to	  radical	  alternatives	  to	  that	  power—something	  labor	  historians	  are	  loath	  to	  acknowledge.	  We	  should	  continue	  to	  listen	  carefully	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  working	  people—always	  checking	  vigilantly	  that	  our	  own	  hopes	  and	  aspirations	  do	  not	  cloud	  their	  history.	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